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REMARKS OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D . , MONTANA)
AT THE SEMI-ANNUAL MEETINGS OF THE
GLASS CONTAINER MANUFACTURERS INSTITUTE , INC .
THE ARIZONA BILTMORE, PHOENIX, ARIZONA
OCTOBER 26, 1972
ll :00 A. M. , P. S . T.
CHINA REVISITED:

A NEW ERA IN ASIA

We are in the open- season in politics .
allegation fly thick and fast .
directions .

The arrows of

Political pot- shots come from all

North, south, east and west, the land is strewn with

tattered public reputations .
I have no inclination to join in the personal carnage.
it is over our national ills will still be with us.

\

not be made any easier by the wounds of politics.
~

is a bipartisan audience--at least, I hope
present .

When

Their cure will
In any event, this

there .~re

a few Democrats

It would be appropriate in the circumstances, I think, to

eschew the political in my remarks .

Let me proceed on the principle

that people who live in the glass houses of national politics should
not throw stones, especially at a convention of glass makers.
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It is my intention, instead, to talk to you about a nation
where recycling is not an issue because waste has been recycl ed since
time immemorial .

It is a nation where neither bottles nor anything

else of value is thrown away .

It is a nation several thousand years

older than the United States and many times more densely populated,
yet whose rivers and streams run ' teeming with f i sh.
This year the international roads have all led to that country
and t o its capital of Peking .

There is an ancient Chi nese proverb

wh i ch loosely translated says that "the journey of a thousand miles
begins with the first step . 11

In a shift of h i story,, t h e first major

step towards China was taken for this nat i on by President Nixon and

\

I applaud him for it .

When a similar shift is also noted in the

President's approach to Soviet Russia, we begin to have some measure
of the magnitude of the transition which is underway in the international scene .
The President's visit to Peking set off a chain reaction .
Subsequent missions were undertaken by the bipartisan leaderships of
the Senate and the House .

Additional visits of international
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significance have been undertaken by other countries, most recently,
that of Prime Minister Tanaka of Japan.
To grasp what is taking place today, these visits must be seen
against the background of past policy toward China.

At mid-century,

the American political scene was dominated by one theme:
China? 11

11

Who lost

Stentorian voices asked the question from one end of this

nation to the other.

Scapegoats were dragged out of government

agencies and academic life to be paraded before Congressional committees anu held up to public scorn.

We sought an explanation for the

failure of a policy in this fashion because none
ble at the time.

oth~r

seemed plausi-

Fresh from the great military triumphs of World

War II, we were not yet ready--as a nation--to face the fact that
three-quarters of a billion people could not be won or lost in the
mid-twentieth century by anybody except themselves.

It was incon-

ceivable to us that anything except betrayal could be at fault in
the

11

loss of China. 11

- 4 So the idea that China was something which had been allowed
to slip through our fingers into the hands of Moscow became firmly
imbedded in the nation's Asian policies .

So, too, did we come to

accept the illusion that China was recoverable by us, in due course,
by ostracizing or flailing the government in Peking as
and

11

unleashing 11 Generalissimo Chiang Kai- shek .

11

un- Chinese 11

-

These concepts were

expressed in a policy of building a military wall around China and
preparing, on Taiwan, forces of the National Government to retake the
mainland .
In time, this obsessive policy led us to send. tens of thousands
of Americans and Chinese, not to speak of Koreans to their deaths
unnecessari~y

parallel .

in the rash extension of the Korean war beyond the 38th

It led us to form a cha i n of Asian treaties whose links

were Taiwan, Japan, South Korea and nations of Southeast Asia-- all
wea k and all dependent on the United States for survival .

U. S . bases

were established, Willy nilly, in countries throughout the area .
of thousands of U. S . forces were deployed to man the bases .

Tens

Tens
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of billions of dollars were spent for military activities and fore i gn
aid.

Huge staffs of U. S . government administrators, military advisors,

construction workers and others were
The so-called

11

se~to

administer the aid .

containment policy 11 for the Far East which had

been prec i pitated by an express i on of indignant

pub~ic

aversion to a .

revolutionary China led us, step by step, into the terrible tragedy
of Indochina.

Nowhere along the line --and I include the Congress

with the various presidential administrations and the permanent bure aucracy of the government- - did we find the wisdom and strength to
break the inertia .

We failed even to restrain this process until

more than half a million Americans were bogged down in Indochina and
our country

\

~as

confronted with the greatest internal divisiveness

since the Civil War .
He were drawn into a vortex by what was seen as a

11

lost 11 China,

a reckless, beligerent c ommunist monster, set loose by Moscow.

The

irony was that at the very same time, the leaders in Peking were regarding themselves as trying only to assert control over traditional

- 6 territories and attempting to build a new and unified nation
capable of meeting the needs of the Chinese people.
of

11

Our policy

containing China 11 whether expressed in Korea, Taiwan or Viet

Nam, in nuclear bases in Okinawa or in U-2 flights over Chinese
territory, was interpreted by Peking as a vicious extension of
Western imperialist efforts to dominate China.
a new generation as the number one enemy.

We were held up to

For the first time in

decades, Chinese children were encouraged to hate the government
of the once "beautiful country" as the name

11

America 11 translates

into Chinese.
That is in the past.

The raw confrontation is now over.

Together with the Peking government, we have embarked on what is
likely to be a long slow journey of restoration.

President Ni xon's

visit to Ch i na early this year was a symbolic act of the highest
s ign i ficance in this process.

When the President and the Chinese

Premier touched glasses in toasts of mutual f riendship, the death
knell of the containment policy in Asia tolled across the Pacific.

- 7 As I have noted, the joint Senate leadership followed the
President to China last April and May.

Let me give you, now, a

few first-hand impressions of the changes which have taken place
A)

-~

in the lives of over 8oo,oo~ D people--one fourth of the world's
population .

I do so in order to provide some indication of the

kind of nation with which the world must reckon.

What the joint

leadership concluded differs little from what other Americans have

-...

found in visits to the new China .
To digress for a moment, I might mention that I served as a ·
Marine in the old China.
Marines.

Ever since I have been partial to the

When I was in the Navy, I never rose above the rank of

Seaman 2nd Class.

During my Army hitch, I remained a buck private .

But the Marines, recognizing certain exceptional qualities in my
soldiering, elevated me for the rest of my military career to the
rank of P. F. C.
I must add that my exposure to th& old China was not limited
to a KP's view of the warlord era when Chinese scavenged the garbage

- 8 cans of the mess halls for food.

In 1944, I went again, as a young

Congressman on a mission for President Roosevelt, to a diseaseridden, famine-stricken, wartorn free China, traveling the old
Burma Road and many parts of the West, specifically Yunnan and
Szechwan.

Again, shortly after the Japanese surrender, I visited

Peking and Tientsin once more and Tsingtao on the Northeast coast.
The contrast between the old China and China today, is
extraordinary.

To be sure, the Chinese People's Republic is more

closely controlled and highly organized than ever before.
lectual and artistic freedom are non-existent.

Intel-

Nor is there

representative government and free enterprise, as we know them.
However, if we have learned one truth from our experiences in Asia,
it should be that American values are not necessarily adaptable
wholesale in Asia.
What is of greatest relevance to the Chinese people at this
time is that the present system has led to the availability of
adequate food, shelter, clothing and simple consumer goods.

It

- 9 has :ed to great adv3nces in public health care, bast e education,
transportat~on,

electrification, and the ljke.

It has developed

an economy which is capable of manufacturing, out Qf Chinese
resources, thousands of products, from a pin to nuclear devices
and space satelljtes and the machine tQols to produce them.
What is relevant, too, is that the superstructure of control
is manned, not by a conspicuous and highly privileged elite as
in the past but by men and women who work among the people, who
dress like them and live with them.

Conformity there js, as there

has always been, for the great numbers of Chinese but it
produced by a visible whip.

s not

Indeed, I do not th2nk I saw more than

one or two f:re-arms anywhere in China during the ent i re visit.
What is most striking is a universal sense of participation
in work.

A bona fide national family is emerging, with a 'one for

all and all for one" concept of society.

The present system, in

short, seems to have succeeded in undergirding the personal pride
of the Chinese in China.

As Chou En-lai put it, ''The Chinese people

-

can stand up again. '1
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As never before, China seems strong, dynamic,

unified and virtually classless.
As this vast uplift has gained in momentum, nat:ons have
beat a path to China's door.
the President's initiative.

For us, the time was over-ripe for
For several years, hostility between

the United States and China has been receding.

Long before the

President's visit, this country has ceased to be an unmitigated
ogre in China's eyes.

The focus of Peking's concern began to shift

elsewhere a decade ago, notably

t~

the Soviet

Uni~n

and to Japan.

Only the intrusion of the ill-fated Vietnamese involvement concealed
the extent of the shift.
As for the Soviet Union, at first, the Chinese leaders felt
to that country
bound closely/by what seemed to be a common ideology.

Moreover,

the relationship was cemented by the unifying force of a hostile
outside world.
diverged.

Over the years, however, ideoJogical concepts

A serious cleavage developed between the two nations and

long-standing border questions and other irritants came into view.
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The Soviet aid-program is a prime example.

At first welcomed, it

came to be seen in Ch na as something of a fraud which carried too
high a price tag for inferior goods and technologies.

While the

program has long since been discontinued and the Russians paid in
full and sent home, the sense of being cheated still rRnkles among
the Ch1nese.
Most serious, one million Soviet and Mongolian armed forces
on China's border are no longer regarded as communist allies.

On

the contrary, these forces now loom as a menace of major prooortions
on a par with, if not greater than U. S. military bases in Asia or
the prospect of a rearmed Japan.
As for China and Japan, the recent meeting of Premier Chou
and Prime Minister Tanaka sets the stage for further changes in the
special ties of the latter country with the United States.

Since

World War II, the Japanese have looked primarily to this nation not
only for security but also for the great portlon of the foreign trade
which supports their economic well-being.

On the other side of the
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coin, Japan has followed very closely the U. S. lead in internat i onal
relations.

Now, an immense economic dynamism has developed in Japan.

Japanese productive capacity ranks third in the world and Japanese
trade is flourishing on all continents.

This econom i c growth makes

possible greater independence in international policies; indeed, it
makes greater independence necessary.
The political settlement which has been achieved with China
foreshadows the end of the unequal and quasi-dependent relationship
with the United States.

On the one hand this change is welcomed

. . both here and in Japan.

On the other hand, anxieties over what

the future may hold

to some mutual recrimination.

ha~led

It is

the responsibility of diplomacy and statecraft to hold in check
tendencies of this kind.

On that score, T must say in all candor,

that there has been some slippage on the part of the Administration.
I can conceive of no greater tragedy for the Pac i fic region
than that the inevitable transition in the U. S. - Japanese relationship terminate in its disruption.

To avoid such an outcome,

- 13 it would be helpful to recognize frankly that Japan's great
econo~ic achievements in recent years have been pinching at

sens i tive political and commercial nerves in this country.

Pre-

1
occupied for too long with Viet Nam, we have awakened to discover
that our industry is no longer able to compete in many fields with
the Japanese.

While we have been wasting our substance, skills,

manpower and industrial creativity in Indochina, the Japanese have
been putting insignificant outlays into military purposes.

Their

economic energies have been concentrated, instead, on peaceful
production and trade.

It is not surprising, in the circumstances,

that for the last six years, the

Un ~ted

States has had a bilateral

trade deficit wi th Japan, which reached an all-time high of
$3.2 billion last year.
Japan's reestablishment of relations with China, in my
judgment, is in the interests of all concerned.

The door will now

.. .
open still more widely to a Sino-Japanese trade which is already
large and growing.
;

In so do i ng, it will lessen the pressure of

--------- -~----~------------------~------------------~--~----~~---~-

- 14 Japanese competition in U. S. markets.

Furthermore, it may well

•

'
stimulate
the Soviet Union into a heightened economic interchange

with Japan, especially in connection with the Soviet Maritime
•

Provinces and Siberia.
These adjustments can go far to untangle the trade lines of
the Far Pacific which were distorted by ideological conflicts in
the aftermath of World War II.

Moreover, they dovetail with the

clearing away of trade barriers between the United States and China
and the United States and the Soviet Union.

Taken all together,

these shifts could lay a firm economic base for peaceful relationships between Japan, China, the Soviet Union and the United States
in the Western Pacific.

The question is can there also be found

i n a l l four countri es the pol i t i cal wit and diplomatic wisdom to build
a quadripartite base of stability in that region?
Early steps will involve adjustments i n security relationships, notably in the defense treaties between Japan and the United
States and the Soviet Union and China.

These treaties were entered

- 15 into in a different time and situation.

Insofar as the Japanese -

U. S. relationship is concerned, it is likely that the U. S. nuclear
safeguards for Japan will remain significant for some .t ime.

Outside

l
this umbrella, however, it seems to me that U. S. bases on Japanese

territory, which have already declined in importance, will have
lost additional significance as a result of the Chou

Tanaka and ·

the Chou - Nixon communiques.
Present developments among the larger countries of Asia
have set in motion repercussions elsewhere.

After two decades of

unrestrained invective, for example, the two Koreas are talking
amicably.

Thailand has accepted a Chinese invitation to take its

table tennis team to Peking.

The ping-pong players will .be accom-

panied . by government emissaries carrying not only paddles and
ping-pong balls, but, in all probability, briefs on Sino-Thai
international issues.

It will be only a matter of time, I should

think, before relations are normalized between China and Thailand,
Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Australia and New Zealand.

- 16 In short, from one end of the Western Pacific to the other,
outmoded policies are on the way out.

What still remains intact,

however, are this nation's military and other arrangements around
the rim of the People's Republic of China.

The next step for this

Administration or its successor, it would seem, will involve an
examination of these arrangements, indeed all the tools--the
treaties and other measures--by which antiquated doctrines are
still being pursued in Asia.

The cutting edge of these tools will

have to be reset so that they may be applied in follow-through on
the President's initiative and wi th relevance to the contemporary
realities of the Far East.
It would be well to bear in mind in this connection that
the United States is, and will continue to be, a Pacific power.
We should cease now to act as an Asian power as we have been trying
to do for the past quarter of a century.

The fact is that we have

no vital--I stress the word vital--interest on the mainland of Asia
except to extricate ourselves from the quicksands of Indochina.

- 17 To meet our vital Pacific interests--and, as distinct from those
in Asia, they are vital--does not require us to continue to maintain
hundreds of thousands of armed forces and over 100 major bases
throughout the Western Pacific at a cost of billions of dollars
annually.

It does not compel us to give vast quantities of arms

and other wasteful aid to dubious governments.

The deployment of

our military forces and our resources should be matched to contemporary needs and not to the myths of the past.

It is time for

careful, in-depth studies of all of our non-nuclear security
commitments in Asia and it would be my hope that such studies will
be undertaken in the Senate and elsewhere during the . next

~ngress.

Over the hopeful developments in Asia, there still hangs
the cloud of Indochina.
Southeast Asian policies.

Our nation remains entrapped by its own
To be sure, fewer Americans than in the

past now die in Indochina each week and that is cause for gratitude.
That does not excuse us, however, from facing the fundamental issue.
What we must ask ourselves bluntly is why any American should die
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..
in Indochina?

Why is there, still, any American involvement in

a war which is now looked upon as a mistake by almost all Americans?
The continued involvement in Indochina works against the
long-range interests of this nation not only in Asia but throughout
the world and at home.

It is debilitating our economy at the rate

of at least some $8 billion a year now, or about $40 out of the
pockets of every man, woman, and child in the nation.

We are

building up public obligations which not only feed inflation but
which will carry well into the 21st Century.

The involvement is

helping to destroy the lives of thousands of Indochinese every week
in a war which, ·less and less, draws distinctions between combatant
and non-combatant, "smart bombs" notwithstanding.

Like a cancer,

the war eats away at the v i tality of our national life and the trust
of Americans in each other and in their government.

It is feeding

on the nation's soul, stripping away the concern that has made
America, America--a decent concern for the life of all human beings
wherever they may be.

j
- 19 The longer we continue in Indochina the more we place
ourselves at a disadvantage in tackling the real problems facing
· us in the Pacific.

The waters of that ocean touch the shores of

the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, and China.
Pacific nations.

We are all

Our fates are interwoven in a complex of common

and divergent interests.

It is going to tax us to the fullest to

deal with that complex in a way which serves the well-being of
this nation.

We can ill afford to approach the new situation in

the Western Pacific with one foot in the trap of Indochina.
We have made a start--a good start.

We have begun, belatedly,

to face up to the present and to look to the future."

We have a

long way to go but the first step is the longest and the most
di fficult.

We can continue with assurance along this path on which

we have entered in Asia, recognizing that it is but a sector of the
path of brotherhood, mutual understanding and equality for all men
everywhere.

In the end, the goal is the same--peace, peace for

ourselves and our children and our children's children.

